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Preface: The Usalama Project
The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been mired 
in violence for two decades and continues to be plagued by dozens of 
armed groups. Yet, these groups—and how they interact with their social 
and political environment—remain poorly understood. The Rift Valley 
Institute’s Usalama Project (Usalama means ‘safety’ or ‘security’ in 
Swahili) is a field-based, partner-driven research initiative that aims to 
examine armed groups and their influence on Congolese society. 
While the first phase of the Usalama Project (2012–2013) focused on 
‘understanding armed groups’, the second phase (2015–2016) investigates 
‘governance in conflict’. It is guided by a series of questions: How do 
armed actors affect conflicts related to public authority? How, in turn, 
do local authorities shape patterns of armed group organization? And 
what are the effects of armed group presence on governance and service 
provision? The research also examines government policies and external 
interventions aimed at reducing armed group activity and improving the 
quality of local governance and conflict resolution.
The project takes a primarily qualitative approach, drawing on exten-
sive fieldwork by both international and Congolese researchers. It traces 
the trajectories of armed groups and analyses the contexts in which they 
operate by means of interviews with a wide range of actors—including 
local authorities, representatives of civil society, small and large-scale 
business interests, and members of armed groups. It also draws upon 
available historical and administrative sources, reports and scholarly 
work by Congolese and international researchers and organizations. 
Many of the interviews for this report were conducted on condition 
of anonymity. Therefore, identifying information is limited to a number 
assigned to each informant with a location and a date, e.g. Usalama 
II project interviewee #75, Bukavu, 15 October 2015. However, where 
indicating the location is suspected to reveal the identity of the informant, 
no place is given to guarantee anonymity. In the course of the research, 
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accounts of potentially disputed events were confirmed by multiple 
sources with first-hand knowledge of the events under discussion.
The ‘Governance in Conflict’ phase of the Usalama Project is part 
of the Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP), led by the 
University of Edinburgh’s Global Justice Academy and funded by the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID). 
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Summary 
For more than 20 years, Kalehe and Walikale, two territories connecting 
the provinces of North and South Kivu, have been characterized by a 
proliferation of armed groups. The first of these groups emerged during 
the Masisi war in North Kivu, which pitched autochthonous1 and migrant 
communities against each other and affected ethnic cohabitation in Kalehe 
and Walikale. During the Congolese wars, these armed groups evolved 
into one of the leading Mai-Mai groups, which occupied vast parts of 
both territories and installed its own structures of dominance. The start 
of the peace process in 2003 did not put an end to the local process of 
militarization. While in Walikale part of the former Mai-Mai movement 
transformed into the Mai-Mai Kifuafua, the successful campaigns of the 
Raia Mutomboki against the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda 
(FDLR, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) in Shabunda 
eventually also spread to Kalehe and Walikale. Although the FDLR has 
been largely ousted from both territories, the Raia Mutomboki continues 
to be a key player in the local political and military landscape and has 
become deeply involved in different domains of public life, including the 
provision of protection, conflict resolution and taxation.
This report analyses the involvement of these armed groups in public 
life in the territories of Kalehe and Walikale, which is the outcome of 
the intersection of a number of local historical processes with larger 
national and regional dynamics. The current political and military 
landscape in these territories, defined by the presence of armed groups 
and the consequent fragmentation of local authority, is mainly caused 
by unresolved tensions between and within communities over terri-
tory, authority and resources; the lack of capacity of the Congo’s state 
services to provide protection; and the limited success of reintegration 
efforts. The report explores how these armed groups are embedded in 
1 Autochthony is the idea that a community was the first to inhabit a certain place, thus 
entitling it to land and the exercise of customary power.
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local communities, how they are connected to local power struggles and 
how they are involved in the exercise of local authority, including in the 
fields of security, dispute resolution and revenue generation. Armed 
groups are able to mobilize popular support by evoking two issues 
of existential importance to local communities—marginalization and 
security. While the former revolves around the historical marginalization 
of local communities in politics and governance, the latter frames local 
communities as in need of protection. These issues give meaning to 
armed groups’ bids for local authority and legitimize their engagement 
in a wide range of governmental practices normally ascribed to the state, 
such as taxation and the provision of justice and security.
Armed groups have evolved into dominant power brokers, which are 
deeply involved with ruling territory, people and resources. They have 
become part and parcel of local and sometimes national power dynamics, 
have colluded with local and national political and customary leaders, and 
have developed different techniques and strategies to impose or sustain 
their authority. The end result is further militarization and fragmentation 
of public space and social interactions.
In order to reverse this dynamic and promote a demilitarization of 
public life in Walikale and Kalehe, it is first essential to address the 
civilian support networks of armed groups. It is then equally important to 
deal with more structural causes of militarization, including the conduct 
of the security forces, and to promote more transparent and accountable 
state institutions. Two other issues that are interconnected and require 
specific attention are the return of refugee populations and disputes over 
landownership. These cannot be resolved without a genuine national 
land reform process, which requires the mobilization of the necessary 
political will and technical capacity. 
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1. Introduction
Today’s proliferation of armed groups in the territories of Kalehe (South 
Kivu) and Walikale (North Kivu) is intimately related to a wide spectrum 
of sources of contestation. Although diverse in scope and form, they all 
seem to revolve around the issues of who has the right to rule where, over 
whom and what.2 
In 1992, intensified political competition—as part of an announced 
national process of democratization and struggles over land—led to 
the first eruption of violence between different ethnic communities 
in Walikale. These clashes soon affected neighbouring Kalehe and 
set in motion a long-term process of armed group mobilization that 
still continues. During the two Congo Wars (1996–1997, 1998–2003), 
armed groups merged into a large and well-organized Mai-Mai resis-
tance movement fighting against Rwandan occupation. The movement, 
headed by Padiri Bulenda, eventually succeeded in occupying large parts 
of Kalehe and Walikale, along with neighbouring territories. It was 
more than just a resistance movement. It also projected a form of state 
power. The group’s leadership mixed local demands for self-rule with 
a discourse of defence of the nation state against foreign aggression, 
garnering massive popular support.
The transition period (2003–2006) failed to put an end to armed group 
proliferation and restore state authority. In most cases, Mai-Mai leaders 
lacked the necessary bargaining power, internal cohesion and privileged 
entry to patronage networks in Kinshasa to get access to high-ranking 
positions within the post-war security forces. This partly explains why 
pockets of armed resistance remained active in several areas. Elsewhere, 
Mai-Mai combatants who joined military integration or disarmament, 
2 This report is based on extensive and long-term fieldwork carried out by the authors 
and on specific PSRP field research carried out by a team of field researchers in October 
and November 2015. Interviews were conducted with customary chiefs, security services, 
armed group members, civil society members and the local population. In addition, 
archives and documents were consulted.
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demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes did so with limited 
success. Those who reintegrated into local society often found themselves 
marginalized and with limited economic opportunities.
At the end of 2011, the arrival of the Raia Mutomboki from the 
Shabunda territory set in motion a new process of armed mobilization. 
The success of its often brutal campaigns against the FDLR ensured 
its vast popularity. Supported by local customary chiefs, many youth 
were mobilized to join the fight against the FDLR. The movement also 
provided an attractive alternative to demobilized ex-Mai-Mai combat-
ants, who gradually took over control of the movement in Kalehe. Once 
the area was cleared of the FDLR, the Raia Mutomboki consolidated 
its power and represented itself as the only legitimate provider of 
protection. The movement also became increasingly involved in local 
struggles over power and customary rule. Existing armed groups, which 
initially saw no other option than to cut their links with the FDLR and 
join the struggle of the Raia Mutomboki, increasingly resisted the new 
movement’s dominance. In August 2014, following an operation of the 
Congolese army against it, the Raia Mutomboki began to fragment.
These dynamics have led to a pronounced fragmentation of the polit-
ical and military landscape in Kalehe and Walikale, with numerous often 
small and semi-autonomous armed groups exercising power over local 
populations. This report concentrates on a number of these groups and 
focuses on their links with struggles over public authority in four different 
groupements (a subdivision of a chiefdom governed by a customary chief 
appointed by the mwami)—Mubuku, Kalima and Kalonge in Kalehe, and 
Waloa-Loanda in Walikale. 
The proliferation of armed groups and the resulting fragmentation of 
public authority in these areas is the threefold result of unresolved inter 
and intracommunal tensions. The first of these tensions is over terri-
tory, authority and resources. The second is due to the inability of state 
security forces to protect the population and the concomitant demands 
for protection. The third stems from flaws in army integration and the 
different DDR processes, which have pushed many ex-combatants back 
into armed groups.
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2. Dynamics of conflict 
The relationship between territory, identity and authority figures promi-
nently in conflict narratives in Kalehe and Walikale. Community leaders 
and armed groups tend to employ nativist narratives framed around 
claims of autochthony to legitimize their rights to authority over territory, 
resources and people. Currently, for instance, armed groups and leaders 
from the Batembo populated areas of Kalehe are fiercely protesting the 
return of Tutsi populations to the Hauts Plateaux (the middle-range and 
higher altitude mountains of the Mitumba range) of Ziralo and Mubuku, 
where they had lived for decades before fleeing to Rwanda as a conse-
quence of the conflicts in the 1990s. The prospect of the return of the 
Tutsi has provided armed groups and community leaders a key argument 
in making their claims to authority. 
This, however, is only one of many struggles over who has the right to 
rule over territory, resources and people. Such contests are also inextri-
cably linked to the exclusion of the Batembo from access to political and 
customary power, which dates back to the colonial period.3 This margin-
alization remains a major source of mobilization in Batembo areas, where 
Batembo political and military leaders call for the state to recognize their 
right to administrative and customary autonomy from their neighbours. 
Finally, as in many parts of the Congo, nativist narratives also figure 
prominently in unresolved struggles over customary authority, centred 
around customary parallelism4 and succession. 
Territory, identity and claims to self-rule 
One of the main vectors of conflict in Kalehe is the aspiration among 
the Batembo that the Congolese state recognize the right of the 
Batembo people to rule their native region by creating a Batembo 
3 Kasper Hoffmann, ‘Ethnogovernmentality: The Making of Ethnic Territories and 
Subjects in Eastern Congo’, PhD thesis, University of Roskilde, Roskilde, 2014.
4 Customary parallelism refers to the simultaneous claim of different individuals to 
customary power as a result of their appointment by rival political or military structures.
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politico-administrative entity. Belgian colonial native policy is at the 
origin of this conflict. In order to govern native populations, the Belgian 
colonial administrators from their arrival in the early 20th century 
onwards, attempted to gather them into ethnically homogenous terri-
torial units called chefferies (chiefdoms) or secteurs (sectors), ruled by 
a mwami (paramount customary chief). These units, however, did not 
resemble existing polities, which were not ethnically homogenous, terri-
torially bound or centralized chiefdoms. This was particularly the case for 
the people living in the forested western parts of Kalehe and Walikale, 
such as the Batembo and Banyanga people who lived in independent yet 
interconnected small-scale polities. In contrast, the Bahavu in the eastern 
part of Kalehe were influenced by an inter-lacustrine political culture5 
and consequently developed a more centralized and hierarchical political 
structure based on a sophisticated system of land tenure and tributes.
While the colonial authorities were able to collaborate with the Bahavu 
chiefs, the Batembo chiefs were less compliant. Consequently, the 
Belgian colonizers did not recognize the Batembo chiefs as independent 
customary chiefs, unlike the Bahavu chiefs who were, instead, incorpor-
ated into the Bahavu chiefdom and ruled by its mwami. This decision was 
informed by a variety of factors, including the Belgian administrative 
policy of amalgamating small chieftaincies into larger ones, the contin-
uous insubordination of the Batembo chiefs, the incessant in-fighting 
between the chiefs, their lack of labour and food contributions, and the 
region’s reputation as being savage and unruly.6 
This set in motion a strong contestation of colonial rule amongst 
Batembo chiefs. Realizing the failure of their policy to rule the Batembo 
through the Bahavu chiefs, the authorities created Bunyakiri, a colonial 
administrative post in Kalima groupement in 1934. 
5 This term denotes an ensemble of similar cultures stretching from Lake Albert, the 
Victoria Nile, and Lake Victoria, in the north and east, to Lake Edward and the Mitumba 
Mountains (west of Lake Kivu) in the west, and to Burundi and Buha (in Tanzania, just 
south of Burundi) in the south. David Newbury, Kings and Clans: Ijwi Island and the Lake 
Kivu Rift, 1780–1840, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1991, p. 330–1. 
6 Hoffmann, ‘Ethnogovernmentality’.
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In 1945, the first administrative map of Kalehe territory was produced. 
At the same time, and perhaps not coincidentally, the idea of an indepen-
dent Batembo territory emerged among Batembo elites.7 Subsequently, 
Batembo elites from Kalima and Mubuku campaigned for the institu-
tion of a separate Batembo chiefdom, bringing all Batembo together 
into one administrative entity.8 Following Congolese independence 
one year later, Batembo leaders continued their struggle, which bore 
fruit in November 1961, when the Provincial Assembly of Kivu created 
the Batembo Chiefdom. Nonethless, a conflict soon emerged between 
Batembo customary and political elites about which chef de groupement 
(customary chief of a groupement) should be elevated to be the chief of 
the Batembo Chiefdom. In 1967, President Mobutu Sese Seko’s govern-
ment revoked all the new administrative subdivisions that had been 
created since 1960, which consequently implied the end of the Batembo 
Chiefdom.9 
The democratization process announced in April 1990 was marked 
by turbulence and the resurgence of nativist political claims. Sensing 
the dawn of better things, the Batembo elites decided, in 1991, that the 
time was right to call again for the creation of a Batembo territorial unit. 
After examining the matter, a commission of inquiry recommended the 
creation of a separate zone rurale (rural zone) in the Kalehe territory 
that encompassed the Batembo-populated groupements, which would 
simultaneously be granted the status of chiefdoms distinct from the 
Bahavu Chiefdom.10 These recommendations, however, never material-
ized, largely because of the turbulence of the democratization period. 
The start of the First Congo War in 1996 and the subsequent fall of 
Mobutu provided yet another opening for the Batembo elites. Led by 
Katora Ndalemwa, the mwami of Mubuku, these elites re-launched their 
7 Action pour la Paix et la Concorde (APC), Analyse de contexte du territoire de Kalehe, 
Bukavu: APC, 2009.
8 APC, Analyse de contexte.
9 Hoffmann, ‘Ethnogovernmentality’.
10 Hoffmann, ‘Ethnogovernmentality’.
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struggle, which eventually became connected to larger political and 
military contests.
Struggles over land 
A second dynamic of local conflict is the struggle over land. The central 
importance of authority over territory is tightly linked to the fact that 
agriculture constitutes the primary economic activity of the populations 
of Mubuku, Kalima, Kalonge and Waloa-Loanda. The vast majority of 
peasants acquire rights to cultivate land in return for paying tribute 
to chiefs. The last decades, however, have seen increased competition 
over land, which sometimes has led to virulent conflict. In some cases, 
competition over land is connected to existing conflicts over boundaries 
of groupements. With the exception of the boundary conflict between 
Kalonge and Nindja, which led to the killing of ten people in 2012, most 
of these are low-intensity tensions. More important is the rise in conflicts 
between individual farmers, who see their access to land becoming gradu-
ally limited, mainly because of land grabbing by local business elites and 
politicians. In Bunyakiri, for example, a provincial minister has been 
involved in a land conflict with local families and the Catholic church 
in Kando for more than five years. In Kalonge, a member of parliament 
grabbed land from farmers in 2012. The same politician was also involved 
in a dispute over a land concession with a local church and its school.11 
In the Katasomwa village in Mubuku, there is a conflict between local 
farmers and mining concessionaires which results in regular outbursts 
of violence.
An additional land-related source of tension is the return of Tutsi 
communities to Kalehe. At present, land disputes are the result of an 
imbroglio caused by the departure of these communities to Rwanda 
in 1994 as a consequence of growing attacks by Hutu armed groups 
and the arrangements they made about their land concessions prior to 
their departure. Some sold their land, others just abandoned it and still 
11 Usalama II project interviewee #309, Cifunzi, 17 October 2015, and #319, Fendula, 10 
October 2015.   
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others entrusted their plots to custodians or guards. In many cases, new 
claimants gained access to these lands during the absence of the Tutsi 
landowners and their return has provoked new disputes over land owner-
ship. These land disputes have rekindled long-standing animosities and 
reinvigorated the discourse of autochtonony both of which are having 
a deleterious effect on inter-ethnic cohabitation. Growing frustration 
around the return of Tutsi landowners helps to explain the persistence of 
armed groups such as the Nyatura, a Hutu group operating on Kalehe’s 
Hauts Plateaux, and the Raia Mutomboki, insofar as they reinforce a 
 reciprocal logic of self-protection. This also reconnects security issues 
to the nexus of land, identity and power, which is at the heart of conflict 
dynamics in Kalehe and Waloa-Loanda.
The re-emergence and activism of the Nyatura armed group seem to be 
partly inspired by insecurity of tenure for Hutu populations, due to the 
expected return of Tutsi refugees, and by an increasing number of land 
grabbing acts by customary chiefs and politico-economic elites. Current 
clashes between the Nyatura and Batembo-led Raia Mutomboki and 
growing mistrust between communities resemble the dynamics of the 
1990s. In addition, suspicions are growing about collaboration between 
the Nyatura and the FDLR to prevent the return of the Tutsi. This is 
inspired by the fact that land formerly owned by Tutsi is now either 
occupied or has been bought by Hutu farmers, who refuse to return it 
to its previous owners. Because the Raia Mutomboki are siding with 
the Batembo in these land struggles, a need for self defence against 
this additional threat reinforces the claims of the Hutu Nyatura. To a 
considerable extent, however, these claims connect to deeper historical 
dimensions of self-defence for the Hutu community in Kalehe. 
Customary power conflicts 
Another driver of local conflict is the struggle over customary rule. Two 
intertwined factors help to explain the rise in customary power conflicts: 
disputes around the succession and legitimacy of customary chiefs, and 
customary parallelism. While such disputes have been integral to politics 
at the local level since before the colonial era, they were aggravated 
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during the Second Congolese War, when the Rassemblement congolais pour 
la démocratie (RCD, Congolese Rally for Democracy) appointed altern-
ative customary chiefs after the start of the RCD military campaign in 
1998, in order to gain a foothold in the Batembo areas that were generally 
hostile towards the RCD.
As regards customary parallelism, in the groupement of Kalima, 
a bitter succession conflict has been going on since 1995. At its core 
lies the contestation of the authority of the current chef de groupement, 
Claude Ngalamira Musikami, by his brother, Jacques Musikami Nzibiro. 
At his death in 1985, their father designated Nzibiro, the elder of the 
two brothers, as his successor. The late mwami’s testament, however, 
included a clause stating that in case Nzibiro was an inept chief, Claude 
should take his place. In 1994, after nine years of rule, the gardiens de 
coutume12 deposed Nzibiro on grounds of mismanagement and incom-
petence. Consequently, rule of the groupement was entrusted to Claude; 
this was also approved by the interior ministry. Nzibiro tried to oppose 
his younger brother’s appointment but without success. In 1998, when 
the RCD arrived in the area, Nzibiro appealed to the rebel movement. 
With RCD help—and taking advantage of the fact that his brother had 
left the area to join the Mai-Mai struggle against the RCD—he took back 
power. In 2003, when the political entities put in place by the RCD were 
abolished, the transitional government in Kinshasa reinstated Claude. 
Despite his legal appointment, however, the conflict with his brother 
continues, contributing to social and political unrest in Kalima.
Conflicts over customary power are also present in Mubuku and 
Kalonge. These are rooted in the customary regency system and the 
local scramble for power. In Mubuku, similar dynamics could be observed 
to those in Kalima, with customary parallelism being reinforced by the 
arrival of the RCD. Customary power in Mubuku remains fragile and 
is often exploited by political and military leaders, who seek to gain 
advantage from the old power struggle between Mai-Mai and the RCD. 
12 Sages who oversee customary structures of power and are responsible for ensuring 
their proper functioning. 
 DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT 19
In Kalonge, the conflict goes back to the 1970s, when two sons of the 
deceased mwami laid claim to the throne of the groupement. In 1993, 
the conflict between the two turned violent and eventually forced one 
of the parties, Christophe Mirindi, into exile in Bukavu. Mirindi’s two 
sons—one a member of parliament at the national level and the other 
at the provincial level—have used their positions to influence social 
and political dynamics in Kalonge to their advantage. The current crisis 
of customary leadership in Kalonge has roots in this long-lasting feud 
within the royal family. Yet, it is also the result of a larger social and polit-
ical dynamic that goes beyond this customary rivalry: the 2006 election 
results and the consequent shifts in the local power balance to the advan-
tage of the Mirindi sons play a critical role.13 This crisis in customary 
leadership is further exacerbated by the mwami’s backing of the political 
adversaries of the two Mirindi brothers. The antagonism is also fuelled 
by the mysterious murder of Chifunzi Teso Ndarubibi, the village chief, 
on 10 May 2013, which triggered an intense political crisis. The popula-
tion is currently divided into a pro-Mirindi and a pro-Nakalonge camp, 
which feeds into the uncertainty and turbulence within the customary 
power structures in Kalonge. 
13 Emery Mushagalusa Mudinga, ‘Un chef coutumier abattu : des spéculations à la 
crise sociopolitique en groupement de Kalonge, territoire de Kalehe’, Usalama II blog 
post, 25 February 2016. http://riftvalley.net/news/un-chef-coutumier-abattu-des-
sp%C3%A9culations-%C3%A0-la-crise-sociopolitique-en-groupement-de-kalonge. 
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3. History of armed rebellion
The first armed groups (1993–1996)
The formation of armed groups in the territories of Kalehe and Walikale 
goes back to the period leading up to the conflict generally known as 
the Guerre de Masisi (1993–1994).14 First were the Katuku. A Banyanga 
village chief called Kaganda mobilized the group in opposition to the 
Banyarwanda self-help organization Mutuelle des agriculteurs de Virunga 
(MAGRIVI, cooperative of farmers of Virunga).15 When the Congolese 
army killed Kaganda, Kiroba Mulembezi, the head of the Wanianga 
sector,16 and Joseph Batende Muhombe, a local administrator, took over 
the leadership of the group that was opposing Banyarwanda militias.17
Violence erupted for the first time in March 1993, when self-styled 
autochthonous militias composed of Banyanga, Bahunde and Batembo 
attacked Banyarwanda at the market of Ntoto.18 This incident triggered 
large-scale interethnic violence in the Masisi Highlands, leaving thousands 
of people dead and many more displaced. The evocation of ethnic stereo-
types incited violence on a grand scale. The power of these stereotypes 
is illustrated in the name of the Katuku and its use during combat. 
In Kinyanga, ‘katutu’ or ‘katuko’ refers to ‘katuko ka muroba’, meaning 
14 The Guerre de Masisi was a conflict between the Banyarwanda and autochthonous 
communities in Masisi.
15 Although MAGRIVI was established in 1980 in Kinshasa, it only became effective in 
1992 in North Kivu, after it garnered the full support of Léonard Nyarubwa, who was 
its acting president in North Kivu and political adviser to Governor Kalumbo Mbogho. 
See: Stanislas Mararo Bucyalimwe, ‘Land, Power, and Ethnic Conflict in Masisi (Congo-
Kinshasa), 1940s–1994’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 30/3 (1997): 532.
16 Kiroba was considered locally as a great fighter, chief and practitioner of dawa ya asili, 
the medicine that the Katuku and later the Mai-Mai used to protect themselves from 
bodily and spiritual injury (fieldnotes recorded between 2005 and 2010 by one of the 
authors of the report).  
17 Usalama II project interviewees #266 and #267, Chambucha, 14 March 2014.
18 Jason Stearns, North Kivu: The background to conflict in North Kivu province of eastern Congo, 
London: Rift Valley Institute, 2012; Bucyalimwe, ‘Land, Power, and Ethnic Conflict’.
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‘autochthone’. During combat, fighters would yell ‘katuko?’ Only those 
who responded with ‘ka muroba’ (‘I am autochthonous’) were spared.19 
The violence in Masisi quickly spread to neighbouring territories, 
including Walikale and Kalehe. In the Waloa-Loanda groupement of 
Walikale, Batembo youth were mobilized and joined the Katuku. Among 
these were Damiano Mbaenda and other commanders of the current 
Kifuafua armed group. Faced with the growing popularity of the Katuku, 
the chef de groupement of Waloa-Loanda, Shebirongo Kakungu Nzaki, 
called on all Banyarwanda to leave the area for safety.20 The chief of 
Mubuku, Katora Ndalemwa, and his councillors forged an alliance with 
the Katuku.21 Batembo chiefs from Walikale and Masisi also created a 
committee to defend their community against Banyarwanda attacks and 
mobilized support from the Mai-Mai Kasindiens, a Nande armed group 
from the Grand Nord (the northern part of North Kivu). This alliance 
established its headquarters in Biriko, Waloa-Loanda but operated in 
different groupements, including Ziralo in Kalehe. Here, Kirikicho Mirimba, 
the current commander of the Mai-Mai Kirikicho, joined the movement. 
Combatants killed prominent local Hutu leader Bugabo and targeted 
Hutu populations in the villages of Chambombo, Lumbishi, Numbi and 
Ngungu, on Kalehe’s Hauts Plateaux. These killings were triggered by the 
refusal of the Banyarwanda to recognize and pay tribute to the Mutembo 
chief of Ziralo. They instead sought to have their own customary entity. 
To achieve this, they allied with the Muhavu chief of the groupement of 
Buzi.22 A cycle of retribution attacks that targeted civilians forced large 
numbers of people to flee and resettle, leading to a spatial separation of 
the Batembo and Bahutu populations. Whereas Batembo populations 
fled towards urban centres in Bunyakiri, Minova and Waloa-Loanda, 
Hutu populations mainly stayed on the Hauts Plateaux.
19 Usalama II project interviewees #266 and #267, Chambucha, 14 March 2014.
20 Usalama II project interviewee #268, Chambucha, 14 March 2014.
21 Kasper Hoffmann, ‘Myths Set in Motion: The Moral Economy of Mai-Mai 
Governance’, in Rebel Governance in Civil War, eds. Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir and 
Zachariah Mampilly, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
22 Hoffmann, ‘Ethnogovernmentality’.
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At the end of 1993, President Mobutu Sese Seko installed a more 
ethnic ally balanced provincial government of North Kivu, with a 
number of Banyarwanda in key positions. He also deployed his presi-
dential guard to quell unrest, while civil society organizations tried to 
foster a truce between different ethnic communities and rival armed 
groups. In Walikale, the presidential guard succeeded in dismantling the 
head quarters of the Kasindiens. 
The fragile calm, however, was short-lived. The arrival of more than one 
million Rwandan Hutu refugees, including between 50,000 and 65,000 
ex-Forces armées rwandaises (ex-FAR, Rwandan Armed Forces) soldiers 
and Interahamwe youth militias, reshuffled existing alliances and had a 
dramatic effect on the local configuration of power. Hutu-Banyarwanda 
started to collaborate with these armed elements, exchanging weapons 
for food, to increase their military capacity. 
Violence resumed and increasingly targeted the Congolese Tutsi, who 
saw no other option than to leave their homes on the Hauts Plateaux and 
flee to Goma or Rwanda. Seeking a truce, Batembo and Bahutu leaders 
requested the vice-governor of South Kivu to facilitate a mediation effort. 
Consequently, a meeting in Kalehe in 1995 instituted a joint pacification 
commission mandated to facilitate the return of displaced populations.23 
It did not, however, succeed in disarming armed groups. Furthermore, 
despite being an attempt to restore security, Operation Kimia (peace)24, 
carried out by the Zairian army in early 1996, provoked renewed violence 
and facilitated armed groups’ access to weapons and ammunition.
The Congo Wars (1996–2003)
The presence of militarized Hutu refugees and their cross-border attacks 
on Rwanda triggered the creation of a regionally supported insurgency 
that launched its first operations around Uvira in September 1996. Led 
23 APC, Analyse de contexte.
24 This military operation of the Zairian army aimed at disarming combatants and 
restore order. It was the first step in a larger effort to bring back peace to the region. The 
operation was launched in Goma on 11 April 1996, and followed a visit to the city by a 
delegation of ministers.
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by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libéra-
tion du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL, Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation 
of Congo-Zaire) ousted Mobutu from power in less than eight months, 
while also provoking new armed mobilizations in the Kivus. 
For the Katuku, the presence of large numbers of Banyamulenge and 
Banyarwanda in the AFDL, as well as the military dominance of the 
new Tutsi-led Rwandan army, which backed the AFDL, proved that this 
rebel movement was nothing more than a Tutsi invasion. A new coali-
tion of Batembo customary chiefs, ex-FAR, Interahamwe and remnants of 
the Mobutu army was formed to stop the AFDL’s march from the east 
towards Kisangani. Mwami Katora Ndalemwa asked Damiano Mbaenda 
to post his troops along la route nationale 3 (Bukavu-Kisangani road), 
from the exit of the Kahuzi-Biéga National Park in Bitale to Bakano in 
Walikale. Damiano appointed Padiri Bulenda as his S4 (officer in charge 
of logistics), based at his military headquarters in Kambale in the Kalima 
groupement.
Fierce resistance by Batembo combatants forced the AFDL into 
negotiations in early December 1996. During the negotiations, Kabila 
convinced the Batembo that the insurgency was a liberation force. In the 
document sealing the deal, known as the ‘Bitale Agreement’, Batembo 
leaders pledged to join the AFDL in the ‘combat against the enemy 
Mobutu’25. In return for their support, they asked for the creation of the 
Bunyakiri territory in South Kivu and the inclusion of young Batembo 
intellectuals in Kabila’s new government, after the fall of the Mobutu 
regime.26 Consequently, several thousand combatants integrated into the 
AFDL, most of who came from Bunyakiri. Those from Walikale, however, 
were increasingly frustrated that the Batembo from Bunyakiri presented 
themselves as the initiators of the armed resistance. Moreover, they felt 
marginalized within the alliance because of Katora’s authoritarian leader-
ship and decided to return home. 
25 Bitale Agreement, 4 December 1996, Usalama Project archive.
26 Hoffmann, ‘Ethnogovernmentality’, 219; APC, Analyse de contexte.
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After signing the Bitale Agreement, the AFDL was given free passage 
through the Kahuzi-Bièga Park, but a considerable force of Batembo 
fighters stayed behind in Bunyakiri. Among them was Padiri, who refused 
to join the AFDL because of the large Tutsi presence. He retreated to the 
forest and started a guerrilla campaign with the help of ex-FAR and 
Interahamwe fighters. After the AFDL had taken over power in Kinshasa 
in May 1997, Kabila, now president, initiated a demobilization exercise. 
Padiri’s group, however, continued its resistance and created a political 
movement, the Forces unies pour la libération des Bantus (United Forces 
for the Liberation of the Bantu), with the Forces armées pour la libération 
(Armed Liberation Forces) as its military wing. 
The start of the RCD insurgency in August 1998 provoked renewed 
mobilization of Batembo combatants and also caused tension among 
the leaders of their community. Not only did the Banyarwanda support 
the RCD, several Batembo leaders also joined the movement. Divisions 
within the Batembo community further intensified when, in June 1999, 
the RCD succeeded in taking control of the centre of Bunyakiri and the 
main road towards Kisangani. The RCD established the long wanted terri-
toire de Bunyakiri and replaced those customary chiefs who had followed 
Padiri’s troops into the forest. This caused new divisions and conflicts 
around customary leadership, which still remain a major source of local 
tension and popular division.27
Two weeks after the start of the RCD rebellion, customary leaders 
from Batembo, Nyanga and Hunde communities and commanders of 
the armed resistance met in Lwana in Bunyakiri, where they elected 
Padiri as the overall leader of the Mai-Mai movement. Padiri appointed 
Delphin Mbaenda as the commander of the second brigade responsible 
for military operations and control of the territory of Walikale. While the 
RCD controlled the main routes, urban centres and mining sites, Padiri’s 
27 The RCD also recognized Hutu claims and created the groupement of Mianzi, 
consisting of territory taken from Ziralo and Buzi groupements, which were both 
transformed into chefferies. In doing so, control over land was taken away from Bahavu 
and Batembo customary chiefs and Hutu-Banyarwanda were able to appoint their own 
customary chiefs (APC, Analyse de contexte).
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troops operated mostly in the countryside where they established their 
own structures of control. The group created its first headquarters in the 
forest around Mangaa in the groupement of Kalima. From there, it devel-
oped a new strategy to further involve civilians in its struggle. Katuku 
leaders were sidelined and a new governance structure called the adminis-
tration des forêts (bush administration) was installed in order to ‘mobilize 
civilians to resume their daily activities and provide the Mai-Mai with 
taxes and food’.28 Customary chiefs, civil administrators and intellectuals 
who fled RCD-controlled areas were integrated into this structure, which 
reflected the official state administration. Like the colonial and postcolo-
nial state, the Mai-Mai model of governance was highly centralized and 
authoritarian, stressing the importance of obedience to the state.
By November 1998, Padiri was widely recognized as the leader of 
a considerable number of Mai-Mai groups. Although these groups 
remained only loosely connected, Padiri became the symbol of nationalist 
armed resistance, attracting new recruits from other ethnic communities. 
Nevertheless, in 2001, several commanders from Walikale, including 
Jules Nabii, Damiano and his brother Delphin, left Padiri’s group and 
installed their headquarters in Usala in the Wanianga secteur of Walikale. 
In 1999, President Kabila appointed Padiri brigadier general and supreme 
commander of all military operations in the eastern Congo, after which 
Padiri’s group started receiving arms and ammunition from Kinshasa. 
While this was a clear attempt by Kinshasa to integrate Padiri’s troops 
into the Congolese army (which did not operate in the Kivus at that time) 
and to increase its military capacity against the RCD, the Mai-Mai kept 
its own command structure and autonomy.29 When Rwanda withdrew 
its direct military support to the RCD and sent its troops back home in 
October 2002 as a result of an agreement between Kigali and Kinshasa, 
Padiri’s Mai-Mai expanded its control and administration over Bunyakiri 
28 Hoffmann, ‘Myths’, 165.
29 Kasper Hoffmann and Koen Vlassenroot, ‘Armed groups and the exercise of public 
authority: the cases of the Mayi-Mayi and Raya Mutomboki in Kalehe, South Kivu’, 
Peacebuilding 2/2 (2014): 202–220.
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and other places previously held by the RCD, thereby becoming the de 
facto rulers of the entire region.
Failed demobilization (2003–2011) 
The adoption of the Sun City Agreement in 2003, which announced a 
formal end to the Second Congo War, paved the road to an internationally 
supported transition process. For the Mai-Mai under the command of 
Padiri, this power-sharing deal was enough to disband most of its power 
structure. Several commanders and political representatives were given 
positions in the new political, administrative and military institutions. 
Mai-Mai combatants either demobilized or joined the newly created 
mixed brigades. Mai-Mai leaders, however, often lacked the bargaining 
power, internal cohesion and the necessary access to patronage networks 
in Kinshasa, as well as the military education, to obtain influential and 
lucrative positions in the new security services. This left many reinte-
grated Mai-May combatants marginalized and without any prospect of 
benefitting from the peace deal. Other Mai-Mai commanders, such as 
Kirikicho, who got frustrated with the integration process because it 
did not meet expectations, refused to join the new Congolese military 
forces and preferred to stay in their own region to maintain their local 
power positions. 
The Mai-Mai forces headed by Delphin Mbaenda in Waloa-Loanda 
were reluctant to join the new armed forces. While some commanders 
responded to the awareness raising efforts of the transitional govern-
ment and integrated into the Forces armées de la République démocratique du 
Congo (FARDC, Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo), 
Delphin distrusted the process. At the announcement of the Amani Peace 
Process in Goma in 2008, Delphin renamed his group Mai-Mai Kifuafua. 
Several failed attempts at integration into the FARDC followed this 
peace process. In December 2009, the group became the first to engage 
in a new reintegration process facilitated by the International Security 
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and Stabilization Support Strategy.30 In early 2010, approximately 475 
Kifuafua combatants registered for army integration in Walikale,31 yet 
by June they had abandoned the process, claiming that no real progress 
had been made. 
The failed integration process provoked a fragmentation of the 
movement into different autonomous factions, some of which resumed 
their collaboration with the FDLR. In January 2011, Kifuafua leaders 
agreed to accept Lucien Saddam Mastaki as the new overall commander 
of the Kifuafua. Several officers of the group did not agree with this 
appointment and formed their own autonomous factions. These factions 
tried to create a new umbrella structure of armed groups operating in 
Walikale. Mastaki’s group agreed to integrate into the FARDC and in 
June 2011 became part of a regimentation exercise (the reshuffling of the 
Congolese army forces into regiments).32 When Mastaki was appointed 
deputy regiment commander and Delphin was left without an official post 
and sent to the Rumangabo training centre, he deserted and returned 
to the forest, where he joined forces with other former Kifuafua units.33 
Delphin tried to unify these factions into a new military structure but 
some Kifuafua resisted this strategy and continued to operate autono-
mously. A meeting with the local population followed during which 
30 This strategy supports the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC), which was launched in June 
2009. It comprised five fields of intervention: security, political dialogue, state authority, 
return, reintegration and recovery and sexual violence.
31 United Nations, Security Council, ‘Thirty-first report of the Secretary-General on 
the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 30 
March 2010, S/2010/164.
32 United Nations, ‘Letter dated 6 June 2011 from the Chair of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council’, 6 June 2011. 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/337/63/PDF/N1133763.pdf. 
33 United Nations, ‘Letter dated 29 November 2011 from the Chair of the 
Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. http://repository.
un.org/handle/11176/16422. 
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it was explained that the group was to take up military positions and 
impose taxes, thus confirming Delphin’s Kifuafua dominance in the area.
The arrival of the Raia Mutomboki (2011)
From 2011, the political and military landscape in Kalehe and Walikale 
changed as a result of events in Shabunda, where new atrocities by 
the FDLR provoked a resurgence of the Raia Mutomboki movement, 
which had initially emerged as a grassroots response against the FDLR 
in 2005. These attacks were a reaction to Kinshasa and Kigali’s strat-
egies to reduce security threats in the region. First, an agreement 
between Kinshasa and Kigali, signed on 23 March 2009, resulted in a 
series of military campaigns against the FDLR. In retaliation, the FDLR 
committed a number of atrocities against the local population. Second, 
in an attempt to break down existing parallel chains of command and 
patronage networks, the government restructured the army by creating 
new mixed units, the regiments. When army units were called back to 
Bukavu to take part in this regimentation process, new opportunities 
were opened up for the FDLR, which intensified its attacks against the 
local population. The Raia Mutomboki’s first successes, in 2011, gained 
the movement immense popularity and led to the large-scale mobiliz-
ation of local youths, often with support from customary chiefs. In search 
of retreating FDLR units, the movement soon spread to other areas, 
again enjoying extensive popular support.34
Inspired by its military successes against the FDLR in Shabunda and 
Mwenga, the Raia Mutomboki arrived in Kalehe in 2011 and in Walikale in 
2012. Prior to this, the FDLR had several bases and controlled consider-
able parts of peripheral areas, including in Kalonge and around Hombo. 
Here, it remained one of the main security threats to the local popula-
tion—even if in some areas forms of cohabitation had developed over 
time. At the end of 2011, retreating FDLR units from Shabunda sought 
refuge in Kalonge, with Raia Mutomboki elements in pursuit. The arrival 
of the FDLR spread fear of renewed violence among the population. 
34 Hoffmann and Vlassenroot, ‘Armed groups’.
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Local youths were mobilized with the help of customary leaders, who 
responded to the call of the Raia Mutomboki to support its fight against 
the FDLR. Several successful but extremely brutal attacks against the 
FDLR were conducted, considerably increasing Raia Mutomboki’s local 
popularity. Its use of dawa ya asili (customary medicine for spiritual 
protection on the battlefield) made it even more popular, which facili-
tated the mobilization of local youth.
In contrast to the Mai-Mai that had previously operated in the area, 
the Raia Mutomboki remained a loose structure, allowing youth to join 
and leave so that they could continue to undertake other daily activities 
outside the group. The lack of military skills among the Raia Mutomboki 
was compensated for by its patriotic discourse and capacity to provide 
much needed protection. Once the FDLR had been pushed out of Kalehe 
and Walikale, the Raia Mutomboki underwent several transitions. The 
movement’s leadership gradually passed from Shabunda commanders to 
local ex-Mai-Mai combatants, such as Shukuru Enamae, Hamacombo, 
Butashibera and Mongoro. The latter groups saw the Raia Mutomboki as 
an opportunity for social advance and played a crucial role in the group’s 
mobilization efforts.35 
The presence of the Raia Mutomboki also produced a number of new 
challenges. For example, the still operational Kirikicho and Kifuafua 
Mai-Mai groups saw no other option but to cut their connections with 
the FDLR, not only because of the Raia Mutomboki’s immense popular 
support and strength, but also out of fear of becoming targets themselves. 
These groups instead became local branches of the Raia Mutomboki, 
even if these alliances were short-lived. For the Kifuafua leadership, 
the arrival of the Raia Mutomboki provided an opportunity to reinforce 
their reputation, swell their ranks with new recruits and acquire new 
dawa to enhance their military power. At the same time, the changes in 
the political and military landscape made it possible for local leaders to 
develop new strategies aimed at strengthening their local and national 
35 Jason Stearns et al., Raia Mutomboki: The flawed peace process in the DRC and the birth of an 
armed franchise, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013.
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political power.36 These dynamics explain why the various local Raia 
Mutomboki fractions gradually broke ties with the original leaders from 
Shabunda and became key actors in political struggles in Kalehe and 
Walikale. Rejecting state authorities (in particular security services) and 
claiming to be the only legitimate provider of protection, they gradually 
imposed their power over local society.
36 Interviews with local civil society leaders, Bulambika, 4–6 October 2012. 
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4. A diversified military landscape 
There are many similarities between the different groupements with 
respect to the local dynamics of armed mobilization, the relationship 
between armed groups and local communities, and armed groups’ 
patterns of governance and claims to local authority. At the same time, 
however, these dynamics, relationships and patterns of governance also 
have diverse forms that vary from place to place. While the arrival of the 
Raia Mutomboki has had a major impact on existing processes of local 
political and military competition, local conditions also strongly shape 
these processes. In Waloa-Loanda, the Kifuafua armed group has estab-
lished a relatively well-organized governance structure and conduct. The 
group has also developed distinct forms of cooperation with customary 
authorities, leading to a rather stable and predictable social and economic 
environment. In the groupement of Kalonge, the Raia Mutomboki origi-
nally received widespread popular support for liberating the area from 
the FDLR, but this support has waned over time. In the groupements of 
Kalima and Mubuku, the Raia Mutomboki has splintered into a number 
of different factions, each headed by a local commander who is in control 
of a number of villages. Here, these factions have gradually become part 
of local conflicts over customary and political power and resources, and 
have entered into fierce competition with the FARDC.
A state within a state in Waloa-Loanda 
The groupement of Waloa-Loanda is a remote area with very little state 
presence. The governance structures currently in place are customary 
authorities.37 Since the early 1990s, the groupement has witnessed a 
constant proliferation of armed groups, with a continuous recycling of 
rebel leadership. Since 2003, attempts to demobilize and integrate local 
combatants have had limited success. Large numbers of combatants 
37 State presence lasted until 2014. One state administrator was officially posted in 
Kilambo but for communication reasons was based in Chambucha.
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continued to operate in the area, either as part of the Mai-Mai Kifuafua or 
as other units that defected. In early 2012, the arrival of the Raia Mutom-
boki pushed these armed groups to join its struggle against the FDLR. 
Once the FDLR were pushed out of Waloa-Loanda, however, the Mai-Mai 
Kifuafua started to resist the dominance of the Raia Mutomboki, leading 
to regular clashes over control of strategic areas. The Raia Mutomboki 
eventually retreated to Bakano, which helped the Mai-Mai Kifuafua to 
re-establish its territorial control over Waloa-Loanda. 
Although the Kifuafua had previously been widely accused of atroci-
ties, extortion and intimidation,38 it is now largely accepted as a security 
and protection force. The group usually explains its continued presence 
by referring to four core issues.39 First, because of the absence of the 
FARDC, it argues that there is popular demand for protection against a 
number of armed groups operating in neighbouring areas. Second, the 
group wants to receive compensation from the Congolese state for their 
efforts against the FDLR. Third, they want to protect the territory and 
the Batembo population against other armed groups operating in neigh-
bouring areas. Finally, some Kifuafua combatants demand integration 
into the FARDC and to retain recognition of their ranks and deployment 
in their home areas in Waloa-Loanda. 
Given the absence of state security services, the Mai-Mai Kifuafua is 
widely recognized as an armée communautaire (communal army). Despite 
being regularly harassed, local residents largely feel protected by the 
group.40 It is considered an important authority capable of governing and 
protecting local communities, largely because it is strongly embedded 
within it. The group has developed a division of labour with customary 
chiefs and is increasingly involved in justice issues and development 
activities. Public authority in Waloa-Loanda, however, remains under 
38 Usalama II project interviewees #276 and #278, Chambucha, 12 October 2015.  
39 Observations by research assistant based on interactions with Kifuafua members and 
customary chiefs, Waloa-Loanda, October 2015.
40 Observations by research assistant based on interactions with local population, 
Waloa-Loanda, October 2015.
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constant negotiation between different parties, including Kifuafua 
commanders, customary chiefs and civil society leaders.
The mutual recognition of authority by customary chiefs and rebel 
commanders creates a comparatively stable and secure environment in 
Waloa-Loanda. At each level of the customary administration, chiefs have 
reached some form of agreement with armed units, even if their relations 
are mostly characterized by a mixture of competition, cooperation and 
deterrence. As the chef de groupement states: ‘The collaboration with the 
Mai-Mai Kifuafua is good, because they are the children of our village. 
… When I observe exactions [demands for payment], I call them.’41 A 
village chief of Kiringa confirms the group’s positive impact on security 
conditions, saying: ‘Those who protect us [are] the Mai-Mai Kifuafua. 
As elders, we have good relations with [its] security services. … At the 
time of the FDLR, we could not go out at night but now people start to 
frequent markets, even late at night.’42
The Mai-Mai Kifuafua is considered to be a local security force with 
a popular mandate to police and protect the population. The group 
recognizes customary chiefs as legitimate representatives of the state 
and invites them to its security meetings (except those on military 
oper ations). Chiefs also exert some influence on the conduct of individual 
combatants. In one instance, when some combatants committed too 
many acts of extortion, the chief of Waloa-Loanda requested that Delphin 
Mbaenda discipline his forces and order them not to carry weapons in 
urban centres. A division of labour between armed group commanders 
and customary chiefs has also been established on justice-related issues. 
Even if some competition exists, commanders send cases traditionally 
dealt with by customary chiefs to customary courts, while the armed 
group’s jurisdiction is recognized by customary chiefs for cases falling 
under the penal code of Congolese law.
Local traders, for their part, have also built a mutually beneficial 
relationship with the Mai-Mai Kifuafua. After the customary chiefs’ 
41 Usalama II project interviewee #293, Busurungi, 16 October 2015. 
42 Usalama II project interviewee #291, Busurungi, 16 October 2015.
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intervention on behalf of local traders, businesspeople have largely been 
allowed to operate as long as they accept the armed group’s instructions 
and authority: 
In the past, Kifuafua combatants were involved in all sorts 
of exactions against traders. Things have changed, however. 
Because of the arrest of those combatants, we observe 
a positive evolution, with a decrease in the number of 
checkpoints. This is because customary chiefs have spoken with 
the rebel commander, who in 2014 gave the order to cease these 
checkpoints.43  
This illustrates the existence of a certain space for negotiation in Waloa-
Loanda and suggests that civilian actors can exert a degree of influence 
on the conduct of armed groups. 
Nevertheless, the Kifuafua continues to be the most powerful force 
in society and remains a considerable burden for local institutions and 
the population. Checkpoints are still common and armed combatants 
are competing with chiefs over the right to tax trading activities, often 
resulting in arrangements that are most advantageous to armed group 
commanders. In October 2015, Major Mungwaere Sheanya, a Kifuafua 
battalion commander, announced that people would be forced to frequent 
the local market in Busurungi and those not respecting the order would 
be punished. This was part of a strategy to revive this market, which had 
seen a steady decrease in its commercial activity.44
The taxation of such commercial activities is one of the main sources 
of income for the Kifuafua. Here, too, competition exists over the right 
to impose taxes between the Kifuafua and customary chiefs, who have 
limited bargaining power. As the president of the market in Lukaraba 
explains, ‘The Kifuafua negotiated with the chiefs, stating [it has] no 
means to get soap so [it is] claiming the taxes of the secteur. We have told 
43 Usalama II project interviewee #278, Chambucha, 12 October 2015.
44 Statement made by Major Mungwaere on 17 October 2015 and signed in Busurungi, 
Usalama Project archive.
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[the Kifuafua that] the market belongs to the state. When [it] insisted, 
we no longer resisted and let [it] impose [its] taxes.’45
While the Mai-Mai Kifuafua extracts its share of profits from economic 
activities by taxing markets and roads, it also attempts to attract devel-
opment organizations to Waloa-Loanda and is involved in community 
development activities such as salongo (community labour). This illus-
trates the degree of its social integration and reproduction of state 
practices. It also shows how the group connects strategies of protection 
and developmentalism. In Busurungi, the chef de groupement has even 
called on all combatants to join these community activities.46
Mai-Mai Kifuafua elements participate in other social activities. 
For example, they attend church services and football games, provide 
assistance to vaccination campaigns and teach at schools. They are also 
members of local associations. As a local priest states: 
We have to live with [the Kifuafua], so we need to collaborate. 
There are no real problems between the Church and the 
Kifuafua. [The group] listens to the Church and the Church 
sensitizes the combatants. No problems either between the 
Kifuafua and the health centre and schools.47 
Arguably, the main concern of this local priest is to avoid trouble with 
the Kifuafua. As such, this form of social integration does not offset 
the group’s position of power, which  stems from its recognition as the 
official local security service. 
Military fragmentation and intra-Batembo rivalries in 
Kalima and Mubuku 
A different reality is observed in Kalima and Mubuku. Here, the arrival 
of the Raia Mutomboki movement at the end of 2011 was enthusiastically 
welcomed by the local population. The massacre by the FDLR of more 
45 Usalama II project interviewee #281, Lukaraba, 14 October 2015.
46 Usalama II project interviewee #293, Busurungi, 16 October 2015.
47 Usalama II project interviewee #278, Chambucha, 12 October 2015.
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than 30 people on 14 May 2012, in the village of Kamananga, triggered 
the mobilization of local Batembo youth. The fact that this massacre 
took place close to the local camp of the United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) 
implicitly reinforced the popular idea of complicity between MONUSCO 
and FLDR forces, and legitimized the Raia Mutomboki in its attempt to 
combat the latter.48 
Although MONUSCO was harshly criticized for its lack of protec-
tion, worsening security conditions were mainly due to the FARDC’s 
internal dynamics. In 2012, FARDC numbers in Kalehe were progres-
sively reduced as government forces were deployed against the rebellion 
of the Mouvement du 23 mars (March 23 Movement) in North Kivu. The 
local population took this as proof of the FARDC’s complicity with 
armed groups operating in the area.49
Feeling abandoned by the state, the local population is willing to take 
things into its own hands. This local demand for self-protection, to which 
the Raia Mutomboki is a clear response, arises not only because of the 
FDLR presence but is also connected to what are considered long-term 
threats to local security. Besides the FDLR presence, these long-term 
threats include the Hutu Nyatura militias on the Hauts Plateaux of Kalehe 
and the expected return of Tutsi refugees,50 which is in turn linked to 
local land competition. This is exemplified by local claims about the 
presence of Tutsi soldiers in the national army, who are perceived as 
invading forces. As a Raia Mutomboki leader, Sukuru, points out, ‘I 
cannot venture myself in being part of an army infiltrated by Rwandans. 
What I do is only to distract the FARDC.’51
The discourse of authochtony explains the gradual shift in the objec-
tives of the Raia Mutomboki. A general perception that the Congolese 
48 Hoffmann and Vlassenroot, ‘Armed groups’.
49 Interview with the chef de centre (head of the centre) of Karasi, Karasi, October 2015.
50 In Bunyakiri, when talking about the return of Tutsi refugees, reference is made to the 
possible return of the 45,000 Tutsi families who left the area during the 1990s and settled 
as refugees in Rwanda. 
51 Usalama II project interviewee #410, Kalima, 19 October 2015.  
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state has failed to respond adequately both to immediate and to deeper 
issues further legitimizes local self-defence. The Raia Mutomboki also 
saw its local power position bolstered when it started getting involved 
in local conflicts over customary power, either by providing mediation 
assistance or by supporting one of the conflicting parties. 
A turning point in the local military landscape was the launch of a 
military operation against the Raia Mutomboki, on 11 August 2014, by 
the Congolese army. Such clashes have taken place since 2011 and can 
partly be attributed to fierce competition over the local monopoly of 
violence, and therefore over who provides security and can claim the 
right to revenue generation. The Raia Mutomboki persistently presents 
itself as the only legitimate provider of security.52 The military operations 
of August 2014, led by the FARDC’s 902nd regiment, provoked a radical 
shift in the local balance of power because it inflicted considerable losses 
to the Raia Mutomboki and significantly weakened its military capacity. 
The armed confrontation had some major consequences. First, it inten-
sified already existing divisions within the Raia Mutomboki and produced 
new splinter groups; for example, in 2012, Shukuru left the movement 
to operate independently. In the Bunyakiri area, five different factions 
now operate, known by the name of their commander. Although some 
collaboration exists, these groups function more or less autonomously.53 
Commander Military headquarters  Place of deployment  
Bwaare Hamakombo Ekingi groupement Kalima 
Butachibera Mwiindja Kachiri centre groupement Mubuku
Shukuru Enamae Mutorotoro groupement Kalima
Mungoro Matafali Lumendje groupement Kalima
Mweeke Atobaibwa Musenyi chefferie de Buloho
Each group is active in its commander’s home region (chefferie or 
groupement). Political expectations, partly resulting from previous 
52 Hoffmann and Vlassenroot, ‘Armed groups’.
53 Smaller groups also exist but they usually lack numbers and are not deployed in the 
field. Examples are the Muganza group in Kabenga (Kalima) and the Taiti and Makofi 
groups in Murangu (Mubuku). 
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dynamics of armed mobilization and demobilization, play a major role 
in this territorial organizational pattern. Some leaders of these entities 
seem to promote armed groups as a way to strengthen their position in 
preparation for potential political negotiations and competition. Raia 
Mutomboki leaders in Kalima, for instance, often state that this is their 
time,54 referring to the feeling of having lost out during the peace talks 
of 2003, when mainly Mai-Mai leaders from Mubuku obtained govern-
ment and military positions. Conflicts over power within customary 
structures, such as in Buloho, also influence how Raia Mutomboki 
commanders position themselves. De facto reintegration into broader 
governance structures appears all the more difficult as security issues 
are increasingly exploited by political, military and economic leaders at 
the local, provincial and national levels.
A second consequence of the confrontation of August 2014 is, paradox-
ically, a stronger presence of Raia Mutomboki combatants. After its 
military operation, the FARDC withdrew a significant number of its 
troops, opening new opportunities for the Raia Mutomboki to position 
its units. This is one of the reasons why the different Raia Mutom-
boki factions are increasingly seen as the only remaining security force 
in some areas. In practice, a sort of implicit agreement between the 
FARDC and the Raia Mutomboki has developed that is characterized by 
non-confrontation and spatial separation. The Raia Mutomboki control 
villages that the FARDC is unable to reach, while the FARDC is mainly 
deployed along the main route that goes from the Miowe river just 
outside of Kalima to the chefferie of Buloho up to Hombo Sud. In Kalima, 
the FARDC presence, next to the main trade centres, is notable. In most 
parts of Mubuku, however, almost no FARDC forces are left, with local 
Raia Mutomboki groups under the command of Butachibera controlling 
most of the area. 
54 In discussions with Raia Mutomboki commanders and combatants during fieldwork 
in Bunyakiri in October 2015, it was repeatedly stated that ex-Mai-Mai originating from 
Kalima did not have equal access to military or political positions during the peace 
process compared to those coming from Mubuku.
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Armed mobilization at the margins in Kalonge 
In contrast to the Batembo, their neighbours, the Barongeronge, inhab-
iting the groupement of Kalonge have, historically speaking, neither been 
involved in the creation of armed groups nor have they adhered to 
existing ones. It was only when a customary conflict caused a deep socio-
political crisis in Kalonge that politicians started mobilizing local youth 
in order to protect themselves and pressure their political opponents. 
While carrying names such as the armée rouge (Red Army), Cheza Mbele 
(Play in Front) and Ntakalaba (Dirty Peasants), these youth groups never 
fully developed into armed forces. 
The lack of armed mobilization in Kalonge can partly be attributed to 
the experience of the Barongeronge with the Batembo-led armed groups 
prior to and during the Congo Wars. The Barongeronge’s first contact 
with the Batiri/Katuku left them sceptical of armed movements. In 1993 
and 1994, for example, the Batiri descended multiple times to Kalonge 
to loot cattle. The Barongeronge fought back with knives and other 
weapons, but they had no firearms, occasionally managing to recapture 
a few heads of cattle and other stolen goods only. The Batiri’s actions 
persuaded the Barongeronge of the criminal nature of the group, which 
they came to see as a band of thieves rather than a politically or ideologi-
cally motivated group. This also explains why the Barongeronge largely 
stayed out of the Batembo-led Mai-Mai later on. 
The Barongeronge have asked the state for protection rather than 
taking up arms themselves. Government forces returned to the area for 
the first time since 1992 in the post-settlement era, with the first FARDC 
units being deployed just before the 2006 constitutional referendum and 
elections, but their presence was minimal. This facilitated the presence 
of FDLR units, which built a number of camps in the area. Up until 
September 2015, there were only about 20 FARDC soldiers in the entire 
groupement—the majority in the centre of Cifunzi, six in the village of 
Fendula and only two in Rambo.
Unsurprisingly, when the Raia Mutomboki arrived in Kalonge in 
search of fleeing FDLR groups from Shabunda, it did not encounter any 
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resistance. Echoes of its success in Shabunda had already reached the 
local population, which welcomed the newcomers with relief.55 Although 
the Barongeronge were happy that the FDLR had been chased away, in 
most cases local leaders did not endorse the Raia Mutomboki and local 
youths did not join the group. In fact, the Raia Mutomboki only attracted 
new recruits in those villages where the Batembo or Barega lived, such as 
the western and north-eastern parts of Kalonge. The presence of the Raia 
Mutomboki in the west of Kalonge may also be explained by the local 
commercial market, which connects Shabunda and other areas to the 
trading centres of Bukavu and Goma. Minerals coming from Shabunda are 
traded between Shabunda miners and buyers from Bukavu, Kabare and 
Goma, offering taxation opportunities to Raia Mutomboki commanders 
originating from Shabunda.
Most of the population in Kalonge experience the current presence of 
the Raia Mutomboki as a burden. The presence of the Raia Mutomboki 
in Kalonge is generally not considered legitimate in the area not only 
because the FLDR is long gone—thus there is no need for protection 
against it—but also because the Raia Mutomboki abuses and harasses 
the local population, and interferes in local power politics and issues of 
justice. The Raia Mutomboki attack against a FARDC camp in Nindja 
in December 2014 reinforced the idea that the movement had become a 
nuisance and that its presence in Kalonge was no longer justified. Some, 
however, still perceive the presence of the Raia Mutomboki as necessary 
because the FARDC is not capable of protecting them. At the same time, 
however, they also demand an end to the extortion on the population 
by the Raia Mutomboki. In response, the group justifies its presence 
by arguing that the state is still incapable of protecting the population 
from the FLDR; that the role they play in providing security at the local 
level has largely gone unrecognized; and that the government is failing 
to tackle the issue of returning Tutsi refugees.56
55 Jason Stearns et al., Raia Mutomboki: The flawed peace process in the DRC and the birth of an 
armed franchise, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013.
56 Usalama II project interviewee #410, Kalima, 19 October 2015.
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Just as in Mubuku and Kalima, the Raia Mutomboki branch in Kalonge 
is far from coherent or homogenous. Its members pursue a variety of 
objectives and collaborate with other Raia Mutomboki groups operating 
in Kabare, Idunga and Shabunda. While its fight against the FDLR was 
once a mobilizing factor for local support, this is increasingly under-
mined by the Raia Mutomboki’s growing interference in local politics 
and the larger role the group plays in issues of justice and taxation of 
economic transactions.
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5. Armed groups and local governance
In each of the different areas, armed groups are an inherent factor in local 
power politics. While they are connected to existing elites and easily 
drawn into their conflicts, they also try to impose their own rule. Their 
eagerness to be seen as legitimate providers of security and protection 
reflects a larger struggle over the right to rule territory, to authority 
and to resources. Armed groups have also increasingly become involved 
in the resolution of small-scale conflicts and have developed different 
strategies to strengthen their authority over local resources. This can 
be understood as attempts to reinforce their local power. The partial 
collaboration and support from the local population is also a recognition 
of these armed groups as local authorities. In the absence or malfunction 
of formal justice mechanisms and because of their relative local power, 
the population solicits armed groups to settle their disputes. At the same 
time, the imposition of their own taxation mechanisms—in many cases 
simply echoing state practices—is both seen as an act of oppression and 
met with some form of compliance. Taxes, therefore, constitute not only 
resources for authorities, they also entail a certain degree of recognition 
of their authority.
Governing justice
In most cases, local conflicts are related to land or family disputes. Armed 
groups increasingly try to assert their right to mediate in these conflicts, 
as an inherent part of their asserted right to rule. While they argue that 
their involvement in matters of justice is due to a malfunction of the 
official justice sector, which is widely viewed as highly corrupt, expensive, 
non-transparent and inaccessible to ordinary people, it is also part of a 
larger strategy to impose and consolidate their own authority. Both Raia 
Mutomboki and Kifuafua commanders claim the right to be involved in 
justice issues and conflict mediation because they see themselves as the 
legitimate defenders of the population. In the end, however, the increased 
involvement of armed groups in the delivery of justice makes judgments 
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and sentences highly negotiable and unpredictable. At the same time, 
this is becoming a key revenue generation strategy for armed groups.
Before the Congo Wars, the customary courts were the main loci for 
the resolution of conflicts and the provision of justice, because of limited 
access to and the corruption of state courts. However, since the Congo 
Wars, armed groups have tried to compete with these courts and claim 
the right to intervene and mediate disputes themselves. This is also the 
case with the Raia Mutomboki. As one of its commanders states: 
We are here to protect the population and to serve the 
population. All our combatants are sensitized and have the 
morality to do so. If our combatants have started to impose 
administrative acts, it is because it produces more objectivity in 
local justice.57  
According to a local observer, ‘militias transform into judges, magis-
trates and judicial police officers in the zones under their control and in 
whatever domain’.58 
One implication of the involvement of armed groups in conflict media-
tion is that this renders justice relatively inexpensive and quick compared 
to state justice. The latter’s lack of capacity and resources has led to the 
development of an alternative market for justice in which a wide range 
of non-state actors, including armed groups, are involved. In the eyes 
of many, such actors made the formal judicial process an expensive and 
unpredictable business. With security services and magistrates levying 
a variety of taxes, arrests and court cases have become a fond de commerce 
(business). The final verdict of judges is often based on the financial 
capacities of the litigants—those who can pay off police officers and 
judges or maintain close connections usually win the case.59
57 Usalama II project interviewee #326, Chaminunu, 13 October 2015.
58 Usalama II project interviewee #346, Chaminunu, 13 October 2015.
59 Koen Vlassenroot and Hans Romkema, Local governance & leadership in Eastern DRC, Den 
Haag: Oxfam Novib, 2007; Benjamin Rubbers and Emilie Gallez, ‘Why do Congolese People 
go to Court? A Qualitative Study of Litigants’ Experiences in Two Justice of the Peace 
Courts in Lubumbashi’, The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 44/66 (2012): 79–108.
44 CONTESTING AUTHORITY
Under these conditions, justice provided by armed groups can turn 
into an attractive alternative to state justice.60 Litigants or accused 
persons tend to solicit the support of armed groups when they believe 
they have a fair chance of winning the case. Armed group commanders, 
however, often lack the necessary judicial knowledge.61 According to a 
civil society leader, ‘Especially with state services no longer operating, 
they [armed group leaders] take advantage of this vacuum to impose 
their rule and provide justice without having the necessary capacity.’62 As 
another respondent states, ‘They interfere in whichever issue. All that is 
needed to make them intervene is to simply inform them.’63
Another perceived advantage is that armed groups can be mobilized 
for one’s own case, as they tend to support the case of the person who 
solicits their intervention. This preferential treatment is a key reason 
why people no longer bring their cases to formal justice institutions or 
customary authorities:
Some people living in areas under the control of the Raia 
Mutomboki rely on [it] because [it] usually judges to the 
advantage of the one who solicits [its] support. [It does] not 
ask [for] any contribution in contrast to the formal justice.64 
In most cases, a decision is made without investigation, which often 
results in a very flawed judgment. This form of justice provision also 
reinforces an existing spirit of revenge, which has led to the development 
of a tit-for-tat approach to dispute resolution and crime fighting. Such 
cycles of retaliation appear to validate the claims put forth by armed 
60 Usalama II project interviewee #439, Ramba, 15 October 2015. 
61 Emery Mushagalusa Mudinga and An Ansoms, ‘Autorité publique et implication des 
forces armées dans les dynamiques foncières au Sud Kivu’, in Conjonctures congolaises 2014: 
Politiques, territoires et ressources naturelles : changements et continuities, eds. Stefaan Marysse 
and Jean Omasombo Tshonda, Cahiers Africains 86, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2015. 
62 Usalama II project interviewee #338, Mule, 10 October 2015.
63 Usalama II project interviewee #336, Mule, 12 October 2015.
64 Usalama II project interviewee #337, Fendula, 10 October 2015.
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groups that they are needed to install law and order, which in turn 
increases popular support for them. 
In Waloa-Loanda, the Mai-Mai Kifuafua has established a functioning 
division of labour with customary chiefs on justice issues. Cases that are 
related to customary affairs are sent to customary chiefs even if they were 
first presented to the Kifuafua commander. Commonly, even in these 
cases, a tax is paid and the accused person is whipped with a chicotte, a 
heavy leather whip made of animal hide, before transferring the case. 
Customary authorities, in turn, recognize the Kifuafua as a legitimate 
justice provider with the authority to arrest people. ‘The Kifuafua do[es] 
not fully claim control over administrative acts but customary chiefs can 
call [it] … to go and punish people who resist to follow rules.’65 Another 
respondent recognizes Kifuafua authority in criminal cases, saying, ‘For 
those cases that include physical violence, it’s the Kifuafua that [is] 
claiming the right to intervene.’66 Customary chiefs, however, tend to 
disapprove of its authority in such cases and have asked the population 
to no longer solicit the Kifuafua, albeit with limited success.67
The situation is more complicated in Mubuku and Kalima, where 
the Raia Mutomboki is involved in a fierce competition with customary 
chiefs and state administrators over the right to judge. Although the 
Raia Mutomboki tends to interfere in a number of different disputes 
(most related to land), some form of collaboration exists with the state 
security services, including the police. In Kalonge, the Raia Mutomboki 
puts on trial cases of witchcraft, a widespread accusation not recognized 
by Congolese law and thus not eligible for the formal justice system. 
There have been several cases of the Raia Mutomboki punishing women 
accused of witchcraft. Reportedly, some of these women barely escaped 
being burned alive inside their houses. The chef de groupement finally 
instructed the village chiefs to discourage local residents from presenting 
their cases to the Raia Mutomboki. They also prohibited the armed group 
65 Usalama II project interviewee #283, Busurungi, 16 October 2015.
66 Usalama II project interviewee #285, Kilambo, 18 October 2015.
67 Usalama II project interviewee #293, Busurungi, 16 October 2015.
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from getting involved in dispute resolution or other forms of justice 
provision but in vain. In contrast to Waloa-Loanda, customary chiefs 
have only limited influence over the conduct of the Raia Mutomboki, 
which largely ignores the chief’s demands. 
The fact that these armed groups have become increasingly involved 
in local dispute resolution or have sided with conflicting parties affects 
both local forms of justice and social order. On the one hand, the 
dispute arrangements offered by armed groups provide an easy, quick 
and inexpensive alternative to state and customary justice68 and further 
reduce the legitimacy of the formal justice system. On the other hand, 
these arrangements promote the negotiability and informalization of 
justice and thus lead to even less predictable outcomes. 
Generating revenues 
A second field of competition over authority and a crucial component 
of armed groups’ claims to rule is taxation of economic activities. Both 
the Raia Mutomboki and the Mai-Mai Kifuafua have developed different 
strategies to increase their capacity to extract resources and to position 
themselves as economic regulatory authorities. These strategies, 
however, include considerable use of violence or the threat thereof. They 
also mainly benefit armed group members and their supporters, despite 
the fact that the Kifuafua has adopted a discourse of rural development. 
This is not to say that taxes are simply being imposed at gunpoint. There 
is some level of negotiation involved, which has created a tolerable modus 
vivendi between armed groups and taxpayers.
When the Raia Mutomboki arrived in 2011 and 2012, most customary 
chiefs played a pivotal role in mobilizing local youths and providing 
spiritual guidance to combatants. They also rallied the necessary material 
support. Local traders and households were persuaded to support the 
youths in their fight against the FDLR and supply food, logistical support 
and other provisions. In Kalima and Mubuku, civilians offered their 
motorbikes to transport combatants and ammunition, while families 
68 Since 2013, state law no longer recognizes customary courts but they still operate.
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and local traders contributed money and food supplies. The amount and 
frequency of such contributions varied but the widespread assistance 
on offer from local populations reflected the immense popularity of the 
Raia Mutomboki.
Following the end of the operations against the FDLR in 2012, 
popular contributions to the movement started to dwindle. In the local 
 population’s view, material support for the Raia Mutomboki was no 
longer justified now that its mission was accomplished: ‘Why should we 
keep on offering material support when the FDLR has been defeated? 
What is the purpose that we should give our money and food for?’69 For 
the Raia Mutomboki, however, its mission went beyond tracking the 
FDLR and was connected to a larger struggle of authority over territory, 
people and resources. As contributions faded, Raia Mutomboki members 
started extorting money from the local population, raiding local traders’ 
vehicles and developing taxation mechanisms to ensure a steady flow 
of resources. In Waloa-Loanda, a more sophisticated fiscal bargain was 
established between the Kifuafua and the local population. There, taxes 
were largely seen as a civic duty, which people paid in return for order 
and protection. 
The forms of resource generation deployed by armed groups are 
quite diverse. In general, they follow the blueprint of previous Mai-Mai 
techniques for resource control, which in turn are a partial emulation 
of the long-standing techniques used by state agents. The main differ-
ence resides in the fact that such taxes are more frequently negotiated 
between taxpayers and present-day armed groups than was the case 
with the Mai-Mai. This can be explained by four different factors. First, 
because armed groups aim to maintain their legitimacy among the local 
population, now that the FDLR has been forced out, taxpayers have more 
leverage. Second, these armed groups, in contrast to Padiri’s Mai-Mai, 
are not at war against a powerful outside force. Third, the high level of 
involvement of armed groups in local politics acts as a restraint because 
they aim not to compromise popular support for local political actors. 
69 Usalama II project interviewee #347, Kambale, October 2015. 
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Finally, part of the population still considers the presence of armed 
groups as necessary, despite their acts of extortion, and thus prefers to 
cooperate with them rather than go against them—even if there are clear 
limits to this compliance with the imposed tax system.
The main source of income of all armed groups operating in the area 
is the taxation of agricultural production and other economic activities, 
such as the use of mills, fish farming, cattle herding, petty trade and trade 
in minerals. In addition, taxes are also collected through fines imposed 
on people seeking resolution of local conflicts. Taxes on agricultural 
produce are levied during both production and commercialization. A 
good example is the production and trade of palm oil. In Kalima and 
Mubuku, producers are obliged to pay seven litres of palm oil each time 
they use the local transformation facilities. When palm oil is brought 
to local markets, Raia Mutomboki members ask for a payment of CDF 
500 (approximately USD 0.50)70 for each 20-litre barrel of oil. In Waloa-
Loanda, palm oil payments amount to two litres for each barrel produced 
at the transformation facility, while a tax of CDF 500 must be paid for 
each 20-litre barrel brought to the market. Other agricultural produce 
(cassava, peanuts and beans) is usually taxed in kind at the market entry 
barrier.71 In Kalima, Mubuku and Kalonge, Raia Mutomboki members 
visit all significant sites of economic activity and production to collect 
tax; for example, at every mill, the manager gives them five kilos of 
cassava flour, in addition to the quantity that each trader pays at the 
barrier on market day.72 Taxes on other agricultural produce vary between 
CDF 200 and CDF 500.
In Waloa-Loanda, the Kifuafua also imposes taxes on minerals at road 
barriers. Payments of CDF 500 are demanded for each 50-kilo bag of 
70 USD 1.00 is approximately CDF 913, as of 6 April 2016 (calculated using http://www.
oanda.com/currency/converter/) 
71 Four pieces of cassava is paid per basket of produce, while one cup of peanuts or 
beans is paid for each sack of produce. 
72 Usalama II project interviewee #352, Kambale, 13 October 2015; interviewee #405, 
Karasi, 20 October 2015.
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cassiterite.73 Moreover, the Kifuafua is trying to get directly involved in 
the production of gold and cassiterite by targeting mining sites previ-
ously controlled by the FDLR, so far with little success.74 According to 
a local civil society leader, ‘Lately, General Delphin Mbaenda and his 
second-in-command, Shalio, spent a long time in Lukaraba in order to 
inspect the presence of gold in the rivers around the village with the aim 
of extracting [it].’75 In Kalonge, control over the mineral trade by the 
Raia Mutomboki is well developed and takes place at the Chaminunu 
market. As the local administrator asserts, ‘Each time Ngandu (Raia 
Mutomboki commander from Shabunda) is here, it is to sell minerals to 
traders coming from Bukavu, Kabare, Goma, etc.’76
In Waloa-Loanda, all of the markets are controlled by the Kifuafua, 
which has gained a monopoly over the right to impose taxes. Every 
individual entering or leaving the market has to pay CDF 500, while 
between CDF 2,000 and CDF 3,000 is demanded for each cow entering 
the market and between CDF 1,000 and CDF 1,500 for each goat. Never-
theless, there is some room for manoeuvre. Both the Raia Mutomboki 
and Kifuafua negotiate taxes with local leaders, customary chiefs and 
economic actors. For example, traders using the route from Bukavu to 
Hombo negotiated a weekly tax of CDF 2,000 per trader with the Raia 
Mutomboki leader Shukuru, who used to raid vehicles that were passing 
through. As a local trader testifies, ‘We have adopted a strategy that hurts 
less. Luckily, we have identified the group that was pillaging our goods 
and the option to negotiate was there.’77 
Producers of palm oil also came to an agreement in order to reduce 
tax demands during production. In Mubuku and Kalima, village leaders 
and traders negotiated the provision of food to the Raia Mutomboki units 
in order to prevent potential harassment. Such contributions are made 
73 Cassiterite is a mineral, tin dioxide, which is the main ore of tin.
74 Judith Verweijen, A Microcosm of Militarization: Conflict, governance and armed mobilization 
in Uvira, South Kivu, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2016, 44.
75 Usalama II project interviewee #276, Lukaraba, 14 October 2015. 
76 Usalama II project interviewee #340, Chaminunu, 13 October 2015. 
77 Usalama II project interviewee #356, Bulambika, 13 October 2015.  
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through a system of rotation, where each village contributes when its 
turn has come: ‘Instead of letting them use force, it is better to reach a 
level of understanding and be a bit flexible in order to prevent the use of 
force. Everyone is aware that the best option is to contribute.’78 
Regardless of the level of negotiation, these taxes remain forcefully 
imposed. By participating in an orderly way in the taxation system of 
armed groups, particularly in Waloa-Loanda, the local population is less 
exposed to random acts of violence, extraction and harassment. Beyond 
this, they also get a sense of contributing to the defence and development 
of the community. Nonetheless, civil society continually denounces these 
taxes as a form of abuse, particularly those imposed at market entrances. 
Customary chiefs, for their part, engage in negotiations in order to help 
their populations and to save face, but ultimately they comply with the 
armed groups. The armed groups, in contrast, do not consider imposing 
taxes a form of tracasserie (extortion). On the contrary, they consider all 
goods and money they extract from the local population a legitimate tax 
in exchange for the services they provide.79 This perspective reflects their 
self-definition as local authorities with the right to rule and impose taxes. 
78 Usalama II project interviewee #270, Lukaraba, 14 October 2015. 
79 Usalama II project interviewee #470, Bukavu, 13 November 2015. 
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6. Conclusion and policy considerations
A detailed history of armed groups since the end of the Second Congo 
War in parts of the territories of Kalehe and Walikale reveals that these 
groups have turned into central authorities deeply involved in ruling 
territory, people and resources. Armed groups have proliferated and 
enjoyed popular support in Kalehe and Walikale for more than two 
decades. Initially the impetus for the proliferation of armed groups was 
fuelled by numerous interconnected disasters, which occurred almost 
simultaneously in the early to mid-1990s, notably the Rwandan genocide, 
the collapse of the Zairian state and violent communal conflicts over land 
and power at the local level. During the Congolese Wars, local communal 
conflicts became sucked into the maelstrom of a multi-level geopolitical 
conflict, which led to the increased dominance of political and military 
power networks that included local armed groups. 
The emergence of the Raia Mutomboki and the persistence of the 
Mai-Mai Kifuafua can be explained by a number of interrelated factors 
including: historic and unresolved intercommunity struggles over land 
and customary power; the weak performance and predatory behaviour 
of formal security and other state services; and a failed demobilization 
and reintegration process which has produced a reservoir of marginalized 
ex-combatants. These same groups have progressively become enmeshed 
in local power dynamics and, in their competition for local authority, 
have turned into powerful actors in their own right, colluding with local 
and national political and customary leaders. This gradual transform-
ation is also illustrated by the shifts in their political strategies, which 
now go beyond community defence to include struggles to impose their 
authority in a broad spectrum of fields of governance usually ascribed to 
the state—justice, security and taxation. 
Other reasons also help explain this perpetual remobilization of 
armed groups. The persistent presence of the FDLR, which continued 
to harass and abuse local populations, and the diminished power and 
resources of local authorities after the peace agreement in 2002, created 
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widespread feelings of distrust and disappointment with the Congolese 
state. This is compounded by the fact that many demobilized combat-
ants find themselves in a difficult social position. For those deprived of 
social status, economic opportunities and protection, joining an armed 
group remains an attractive alternative. Also, armed groups have become 
vehicles for the personal interests of disgruntled officers who have not 
been able to share in the benefits of security sector reform and army 
integration. Finally, exclusive identity discourses revolving around the 
notion of community defence create an environment of mutual distrust 
between different communities and continue to block attempts to 
improve cohabitation between different groups. 
 Both the Mai-Mai Kifuafua and Raia Mutomboki have developed 
different techniques and strategies to impose or sustain their authority. 
There is both a shift over time and a regional difference in their popular 
acceptance. When the Raia Mutomboki combatants arrived in 2011, 
they were embraced as part of the community because they were seen 
as fighting a legitimate war of self-defence against the FDLR. Subse-
quently, relations between the armed groups and the local populations 
have become more ambiguous as a result of simultaneous processes 
of negotiation, contention and resistance. In Waloa-Loanda, the local 
community generally feels protected by what is considered to be an 
armée communautaire. The absence of state services in this groupement has 
provided the necessary space for armed groups to develop into legiti-
mate security forces. At the same time, the Kifuafua’s behaviour is also 
constrained by the relative power of customary authorities, which have 
been able to partly manage the group’s conduct. 
In contrast, the Raia Mutomboki is faced with varying levels of support 
from the population and local authorities. In Bunyakiri, it is in constant 
competition with state services and has become a key actor in local 
conflicts over customary power and political control. In Kalonge, the 
relationship between the Raia Mutomboki and customary chiefs is very 
tense due to the former’s continued involvement in issues of justice and 
power struggles—despite resistance on the part of customary chiefs. 
Even if still seen as the lesser evil by the local population, the armed 
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group’s abusive conduct is leading to growing popular resentment. In 
turn, Raia Mutomboki commanders respond with repressive measures. 
Paradoxically, the Raia Mutomboki is in high demand in cases of dispute 
resolution. This is explained by the absence of transparent and acces-
sible state services and by the benefits of justice that are quickly and 
inexpensively dispensed. The overall result is a further militarization 
and fragmentation of the public space and social interaction. How, then, 
can this trend be reversed and the involvement of armed actors in local 
governance be reduced? 
Develop transparent and accountable state institutions
An obvious response would be to reinstall state authority, as the power of 
armed groups is strongest in those areas where state services are scarce. 
Yet, state services are commonly experienced as sources of extraction. 
The ambition of armed groups to respond to the existing lack of effec-
tive governance through the imposition of their own structures and 
practices legitimizes their presence and conduct up to a degree. This 
should be taken seriously. State security services are seen as unable 
to provide protection and security, while army reshuffles often lead to 
additional security voids. Strengthening local state services can only 
achieve sustainable results as part of a larger governance reform leading 
to transparent and accountable state institutions. This is a long-term 
process that cannot be limited to the local level. It requires a national 
reform framework and the necessary political support. 
Facilitating refugee return and land reform 
Armed mobilization remains inherently linked to historical claims related 
to self-rule and control over land. Rumours about an eventual return of 
more than 40,000 Tutsi refugees to their home bases, including the 
Hauts Plateaux of Kalehe, are creating renewed animosity and leading to 
new divisions between and within local communities. More efforts are 
needed to disseminate accurate information on this return of refugees. 
Structures also need to be put in place to help reduce disputes over 
landownership. 
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Supporting a land reform process
These issues will never be completely resolved without a much needed 
national land reform process. Although such a process was initiated in 
2012, it lacks political will and technical support. Civil society organiz-
ations can play a critical role in pushing this reform process forward, as 
they did during the revision of the loi agricole (agricultural law). Stronger 
and more inclusive advocacy frameworks should be established and 
supported both at the national and provincial levels so that the existing 
deadlock can be broken. To achieve the necessary results, this land reform 
needs to be entrenched in a well-designed and effective legal framework. 
It also requires a transformation of policy and the strengthening of the 
existing governance framework. In addition, it should be recognized that 
what is good for one part of the country is not necessarily a priority for 
other parts. Tailored strategies are thus needed. Finally, existing media-
tion efforts should be strengthened and more structures put in place so 
these can have an impact on larger land disputes and tackle their related 
collective and intercommunal aspects. 
Cutting the links between support networks and armed mobilization
Armed groups strongly rely on civilian support networks, which include 
national and local politicians, customary authorities and community 
leaders. These elites are often responsible for the continued presence 
of armed groups and their involvement in power struggles. These 
links provide armed groups with additional legitimacy, while the same 
groups help to protect civilian leaders’ local interests and influence. This 
contributes to the militarization of social relations. The prospect of new 
elections and the consequent electoral competition give armed groups 
an additional stimulus. Demobilization efforts, therefore, cannot succeed 
without addressing these civilian support networks. Even if legal action 
might have adverse effects, it should be considered as a way to counteract 
financial and political support to armed groups.
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Glossary of acronyms, words and 
phrases
AFDL  Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du 
Congo-Zaïre (Democratic Allied Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo-Zaire)
armée communautaire  communal army
chef de groupement customary chief of a groupement
chefferie chiefdom
dawa ya asili  customary medicine for spiritual protection on the 
battlefield 
DDR disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
FAR Forces armées Rwandaises (Rwandan Armed Forces)
FARDC Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo 
(Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo)
FDLR Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda 
(Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)
groupement  a subdivision of a chiefdom governed by a 
customary chief appointed by the mwami 
Hauts Plateaux the middle-range and higher altitude mountains of 
the Mitumba mountain chain
MONUSCO Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la 
stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo 
(United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
mwami paramount customary chief
RCD  Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Congolese 
Rally for Democracy)
56
Bibliography
Action pour la Paix et la Concorde (APC). Analyse de contexte du territoire 
de Kalehe. Bukavu: APC, 2009.
Hoffmann, Kasper. ‘Ethnogovernmentality: The Making of Ethnic Territories 
and Subjects in Eastern Congo’. PhD thesis, University of Roskilde, 
Roskilde, 2014.
Hoffmann, Kasper. ‘Myths Set in Motion: The Moral Economy of Mai-Mai 
Governance’. In Rebel Governance in Civil War, edited by Ana Arjona, 
Nelson Kasfir and Zachariah Mampilly, 158–79. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015.
Hoffmann, Kasper and Koen Vlassenroot. ‘Armed groups and the exercise of 
public authority: the cases of the Mayi Mayi and Raya Mutomboki in 
Kalehe, South Kivu’. Peacebuilding 2/2 (2014): 202–220.
Mararo, Stanislas Bucyalimwe. ‘Land, Power, and Ethnic Conflict in Masisi 
(Congo-Kinshasa), 1940s–1994’. International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 30/3 (1997): 503–538.
Mudinga, Emery Mushagalusa. ‘Un chef coutumier abattu : des spéculations 
à la crise sociopolitique en groupement de Kalonge, territoire de 
Kalehe’. Usalama II blog post. 25 February 2016. (http://riftvalley.net/
news/un-chef-coutumier-abattu-des-sp%C3%A9culations-%C3%A0-la-
crise-sociopolitique-en-groupement-de-kalonge)  
Mudinga, Emery Mushagalusa and An Ansoms. ‘Autorité publique et 
implication des forces armées dans les dynamiques foncières au Sud 
Kivu’. In Conjonctures congolaises 2014: Politiques, territoires et 
ressources naturelles : changements et continuities, edited by Stefaan 
Marysse and Jean Omasombo Tshonda, 197–216. Cahiers Africains 86. 
Paris: L’Harmattan, 2015.
Newbury, David. Kings and Clans: Ijwi Island and the Lake Kivu Rift, 
1780–1840. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.
Rubbers, Benjamin and Emilie Gallez. ‘Why do Congolese People go to 
Court? A Qualitative Study of Litigants’ Experiences in Two Justice of 
the Peace Courts in Lubumbashi’. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law 44/66 (2012): 79–108.
Stearns, Jason. North Kivu: The background to conflict in North Kivu 
province of eastern Congo. London: Rift Valley Institute, 2012.
 bIbLIOGRAPHY 57
Stearns, Jason et al. Raia Mutomboki: The flawed peace process in the DRC 
and the birth of an armed franchise. London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013.
Stearns, Jason, Judith Verweijen and Maria Eriksson Baaz. The National 
Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian 
knot of insecurity. London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013. 
United Nations, Security Council. ‘Thirty-first report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’. 30 March 2010. S/2010/164.
United Nations. ‘Letter dated 6 June 2011 from the Chair of the Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) 
concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the 
President of the Security Council’. 6 June 2011. (https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/337/63/PDF/N1133763.pdf) 
United Nations, ‘Letter dated 29 November 2011 from the Chair of the 
Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. 
(http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/16422) 
Verweijen, Judith. A Microcosm of Militarization: Conflict, governance 
and armed mobilization in Uvira, South Kivu, 44. London: Rift Valley 
Institute, 2016.
Vlassenroot, Koen and Hans Romkema. Local governance & leadership in 
Eastern DRC. Den Haag: Oxfam Novib, 2007.
Thanks to the quality and content of its studies, 
the Usalama Project sets milestones on its way to 
identify the root causes of the existence of armed 
groups and conflicts in the eastern Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. Such research, in our view, 
remains a prerequisite to end the cyclical wars 
raging in the region.  
—Emmanuel Kabengele, National Coordinator, 
Réseau pour la Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité  
et de Justice (RRSSJ)
